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RESTRUCTURING THE DEFENSES TO STRICT
PRODUCTS LIABILITY-AN ALTERNATIVE TO
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
Nikki Ann Westra*
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, courts have permitted only a very limited
examination of the plaintiff's action or inaction in an action
brought in strict products liability. The plaintiff's conduct has
been deemed relevant only when such conduct has met the
stringent tests of assumption of the risk or misuse of the prod-
uct.' However, this limitation on the examination of plaintiff's
conduct no longer exists in California. On March 13, 1978, the
California Supreme Court, in Daly v. General Motors Corp.,'
announced that the principles of comparative negligence,3 as
enunciated in Li v. Yellow Cab Co.,' would be applicable to
future actions brought in strict products liability.5 Daly, a four
to three decision, marks a significant upheaval in well-settled
strict liability principles. As the court itself noted, the ramifi-
cations of the decision will not be known until subsequent liti-
gation establishes the new dimensions of the doctrine.' Califor-
' 1979 by Nikki Ann Westra.
* Staff attorney, Office of the Solicitor, Department of the Interior, Washington,
D.C.; J.D., 1977, University of San Diego School of Law; Member, State Bar of Califor-
nia, State Bar of Minnesota, and District of Columbia Bar.
1. See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 745-46, 575 P.2d 1162, 1173-
74, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 391-92 (1978).
2. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
3. After discussing various phrases descriptive of comparative negligence princi-
ples, the court in Daly adopted the phrase "comparative fault" for future use. Id. at
742, 575 P.2d at 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
4. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975). Professor Schwartz
noted that in Li the court took care to avoid the area of strict liability. In a modification
of its opinion, the court deleted the word "fault" in a number of places, and substituted
the word "negligence," "perhaps indicating that it did not intend for its holding to
apply to strict liability." Schwartz, Li v. Yellow Cab Company: A Survey of California
Practice Under Comparative Negligence, 7 PAc. L.J. 747, 756 (1976).
In a footnote to Li, the California Supreme Court stated that "[i]n employing
the generic term 'fault' throughout this opinion we follow a usage common to the
literature on the subject of comparative negligence. In all cases, however, we intend
the term to import nothing more than 'negligence' in the accepted legal sense." 13 Cal.
3d at 813 n.6a, 532 P.2d at 1232 n.6a, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 864 n.6a.
5. 20 Cal. 3d at 742, 575 P.2d at 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
6. The court stated that it would "leave broad discretion in the trial court to
implement the details of comparative principles in strict products liability cases." Id.
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nia juries, however, will now be presented with the dilemma of
comparing defendant's defective product with plaintiff's negli-
gent conduct in an attempt to equitably allocate percentages
of liability.7
This article will assess the impact of the Daly case in light
of the public policies underlying the strict products liability
cause of action and will discuss whether the adoption of com-
parative fault principles best serves those policies. An initial
overview of the development of the prima facie strict products
liability case will be presented with particular emphasis on the
formulation of defect articulated in Barker v. Lull Engineering
Co." The public policies underlying the original cause of action
as well as the traditional defenses to an action brought under
a strict products liability theory will be examined.
The article will then focus on the impact of comparative
fault principles in strict products liability actions. The court in
Daly stated that it was adopting comparative fault principles
in order to promote "more just result[s]."I This article sug-
gests that, although the goal of the court was laudable, the
desired end could have been more expediently realized by a
limited expansion of the traditional defenses to strict products
liability actions.
STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY: THE PRIMA FACIE CASE
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,'" was
at 743, 575 P.2d at 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 390. "[Rlather than attempt to anticipate
every variant and nuance of circumstance and party that may invoke comparative
principles in a strict products liability context, we deem it wiser to await a case-by-
case evolution in the application of the broad principles herein expressed." Id. at 747,
575 P.2d at 1175, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
7. As Justice Mosk in his dissent in Daly remarked: "If comparative negligence
is to be applied, how can the trier of fact rationally weigh the conduct of the plaintiff
against the defective product? I know of no other instance in American jurisprudence
in which the antagonists are the conduct of a human being versus an inanimate ob-
ject." Id. at 762, 575 P.2d at 1185, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 403 (Mosk, J., dissenting). See
generally Levine, Strict Products Liability and Comparative Negligence: The Collision
of Fault and No-Fault, 14 SAN DIEGO L. Rv. 337 (1977).
8. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
9. 20 Cal. 3d at 737, 575 P.2d at 1169, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
10. A draft of section 402A was first introduced in 1961. Revisions extending the
types of products covered were adopted in 1962 and 1964. This final form was published
in 1965.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to
his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
[Vol. 19
19791 PRODUCTS LIABILITY DEFENSES
adopted by the American Law Institute in the early 1960's. Its
basic premise is that the seller of a defective product which is
unreasonably dangerous is liable for harm caused to the ulti-
mate user or consumer. This express rejection of the negligence
and contract warranty theories as the only bases of recovery
was first applied by a California court in the seminal case of
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc." The plaintiff, injured
by a defective power tool, was allowed to recover for his injuries
from the manufacturer. Recovery was permitted even though
the plaintiff did not give notice of the breach of warranty
within a reasonable time as was required by California law."2
The court, after a review of prior cases, 3 held that:
the abandonment of the requirement of a contract
the recognition that the liability is not assumed by agree-
ment but imposed by law . ., and the refusal to permit
the manufacturer to define the scope of its own responsibil-
ity for defective products. . . make clear that the liability
is not one governed by the law of contract warranties but
by the law of strict liability in tort.'4
According to Justice Traynor, speaking for a unanimous Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, a manufacturer is strictly liable in tort
"when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to
be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect
that causes injury to a human being."' 5 The purpose of impos-
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
11. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
12. Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
13. Id. at 61-63, 377 P.2d at 900-01, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700-01. See, e.g., Gotts-
danker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960); Henning-
sen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
14. 59 Cal. 2d at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701. See generally Prosser,
Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 9 (1966). For a discus-
sion of the decline of the principles of caveat emptor and privity in products liability,
see Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE
L.J. 1099 (1960).
15. 59 Cal. 2d at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700. This language was
immediately seized upon by courts in other jurisdictions who used it as the solution
to their difficulties with warranty notions. As of 1971, strict liability in tort had been
accepted and applied by over two-thirds of the courts in the United States. W. PRos-
SER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 98, at 657-58 (4th ed. 1971). As early as 1944,
Justice Traynor urged the California Supreme Court to dispense with negligence as the
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ing liability, as enunciated in Greenman, is to ensure that the
costs of such injuries are borne by the manufacturers rather
than by injured persons who are unable to protect themselves. 6
Thus, under the holding in Greenman, a plaintiff was allowed
to recover in strict liability if his injuries were caused by a
defect in the product which made it unsafe for its intended use
and that defect existed at the time the product left the control
of the manufacturer. 7
In Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,'5 the California Supreme
Court elaborated on the intricacies of the expanding strict
products liability cause of action. The Cronin court, in dis-
basis of recovery for defective products, to discard the fictions of warranty, and to
replace them with absolute liability. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453,
461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944).
16. 59 Cal. 2d at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
17. Id. at 64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701. Because Greenman discussed
the plaintiff's lack of awareness of the defect, many subsequent decisions held that the
plaintiff also had to be unaware of the defect for him to recover. The court in Luque
v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972), clarified its position
on this point. Stating that its discussion in Greenman concerning the plaintiff's lack
of awareness of the defect was only intended to show that the plaintiff need not prove
the additional elements of a cause of action in contractual breach of warranty in order
to state a cause of action in strict liability, the court in Luque held that lack of
awareness was not a requirement under Greenman. The instruction stating this to be
a requirement was, therefore, erroneous. Id. at 143-46, 501 P.2d at 1168-70, 104 Cal.
Rptr. at 448-50.
The Greenman case was followed by Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d
256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964). Vandermark held that the manufacturer
of the completed product cannot delegate its duty to have its product delivered to the
ultimate consumer free from dangerous defects. Id. at 261, 391 P.2d at 171, 37 Cal.
Rptr. at 899. Therefore, it cannot escape liability on the ground that the defect may
have been caused by something one of its authorized dealers did or failed to do.
Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652
(1969), extended protection under strict liability to bystanders who are neither con-
sumers nor users of the defective product, where such injury to a bystander is reasona-
bly foreseeable. Other types of persons subject to strict liability are: wholesale-retail
distributors, Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306
(1968); lessors of personal property, Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722,
85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970); sellers of mass-produced homes, Kriegler v. Eichler Homes,
Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969); lessors of apartment furniture,
Fakhoury v. Magner, 25 Cal. App. 3d 58, 101 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1972).
Types of persons not subject to strict liability are: occasional sellers not engaged
in the business of selling, Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71
Cal. Rptr. 306 (1968); physicians and surgeons, Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d
958, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1971); hospitals as suppliers but not sellers of medical supplies,
Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hosp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 98 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1971).
18. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
19. The product) in Cronin was an aluminum hasp that was designed to secure
bread trays in a delivery truck. The hasp, which had a metallurgical defect, broke
during a collision, causing serious physical injuries to the driver of the truck. Plaintiff's
expert testified that the broken hasp was porous and full of holes, voids, and cracks.
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cussing the concept of "defect," went beyond the Section 402A
formulation of strict products liability and rejected the require-
ment that the defectrender the product "unreasonably danger-
ous" to the consumer. 0 The court stated that the requirement
that plaintiff prove not only that a defect existed, but also that
such defective condition is unreasonably dangerous, "places
upon him a significantly increased burden and represents a
step backward in the area pioneered by this court."'" According
to the court in Cronin, the manufacturer is adequately pro-
tected from being an insurer of its products by the necessity of
proving that the product contains a defect in design" or manu-
facture and that such defect was the proximate cause of the
injuries. 3
The inability to formulate a precise definition of defect has
continued to plague the courts because of the "inherent elas-
ticity and resilience 21 5 of the concept. According to Dean Pros-
ser, a defective product is one that "does not meet the reasona-
ble expectations of the ordinary consumer as to its safety. "28
The flaws were in the metal itself and resulted in a lowered tolerance to force. Id. at
126, 501 P.2d at 1157, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 437.
20. 8 Cal. 3d at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
Comment (i) to section 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or TORTS (1965), de-
fines the term unreasonably dangerous as "dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary
knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics."
The California Supreme Court has explicitly stated in its recent decision in Barker
v. Lull Engineering Co. that the rejection of the "unreasonably dangerous" element
in Cronin applies with equal force to design defects as well as to defects in manufactur-
ing. 20 Cal. 3d at 417, 573 P.2d at 446, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
21. 8 Cal. 3d at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
22. The court refused to make a distinction between defects in design and in
manufacture for purposes of imposing liability.
We recognize that the words "unreasonably dangerous" may also
serve the beneficial purpose of preventing the seller from being treated
as the insurer of its products. However, we think that such protective end
is attained by the necessity of proving that there was a defect in the
manufacture or design of the product and such defect was a proximate
cause of the injuries. Although the seller should not be responsible for all
injuries involving the use of its products, it should be liable for all injuries
proximately caused by any of its products which are judged "defective."
We can see no difficulty in applying the Greenman formulation to
the full range of products liability situations, including those involving
"design defects." A defect may emerge from the mind of the designer as
well as from the hand of the workman.
Id. at 133-34, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442 (footnotes omitted).
23. Id.
24. See id. at 134 n.16, 501 P.2d at 1162 n.16, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442 n.16.
25. Levine, Strict Products Liability and Comparative Negligence: The Collision
of Fault and No-Fault, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 337, 338-39 (1977).
26. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw o ToRTS § 99, at 658 (4th ed. 1971). Mere
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The California Supreme Court recently noted that the concept
of defectiveness
defies a simple, uniform definition applicable to all sectors
of the diverse product liability domain. Although in many
instances-as when one machine in a million contains a
cracked or broken part-the meaning of the term "defect"
will require little or no elaboration, in other instances, as
when a product is claimed to be defective because of an
unsafe design or an inadequate warning, the contours of
the defect concept may not be self-evident. 7
Recognizing that the amorphous concept of design defect
is particularly troublesome to apply in a given fact situation,
the court set out to provide its own definition. In Barker v. Lull
Engineering Co.,2 the court held that
a trial judge may properly instruct the jury that a product
is defective in design (1) if the plaintiff demonstrates that
the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary con-
sumer would expect when used in an intended or reasona-
bly foreseeable manner, or (2) if the plaintiff proves that
the product's design proximately caused his injury and the
defendant fails to prove, in light of the relevant factors
proof that some part of an article broke during normal use does not in itself establish
existence of a defect when the article left the defendant's control. The plaintiff must
introduce evidence from which the jury could find that the article was more probably
than not defective when leaving the defendant's control. This does not cause difficulty
when the defect alleged is one in design but can be a problem when the allegation is a
manufacturing defect. See McCurter v. Norton Co., 263 Cal. App. 2d 402, 69 Cal. Rptr.
493 (1968). Note too that a deviation from the industry norm is not necessarily the test
of whether a defect exists. Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 4 Cal. 3d 379, 383, 482
P.2d 681, 684, 93 Cal. Rptr. 769, 772 (1971).
The deviation-from-the-norm test has been criticized as overinclusive and under-
inclusive, and because liability may be imposed as to products whose norm is danger-
ous. See Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability,
32 TENN. L. REv. 363, 372 (1965); Note, Products Liability-Strict Liability-Elimination
of the "State of the Art" Defense, 41 TENN. L. Rav. 357 (1974).
In a recent attempt to define defect, a California appellate court in Korli v. Ford
Motor Co., 69 Cal. App. 3d 115, 137 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1977), stated:
The starting point for analyzing the concept of "defect" is whether the
product is ". . . one which fails to match the quality of most like prod-
ucts, .... " and if so ". . . the manufacturer is then liable for injuries
resulting from deviations from the norm: the lathe did not like other
lathes have a proper fastening device, the brakes of the automobile went
on unexpectedly, the drive shaft of a new car became disconnected."
Id. at 121, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 831 (citations omitted).
27. Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 417-18, 573 P.2d 443,
446, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 228 (1978).
28. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
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. . . that on balance the benefits of the challenged design
outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design."
It is significant to note that the tests in Barker are stated in
the disjunctive. Accordingly, a plaintiff need fulfill only one of
the alternatives in order to establish the defect element of his
prima facie case.
The first test, which requires the plaintiff to show that the
product failed to perform safely, is based on the expectations
of the ordinary consumer as to the product's performance. 0
This test incorporates the requirement that the plaintiff used
the product "in an intended or reasonably foreseeable man-
ner. '31 The implication is that the defendant could refute the
finding that his product is defective in design by establishing
that the plaintiff misused the product.2
In order to meet the requirements of the second test in
Barker, the plaintiff need only demonstrate that his injuries
were proximately caused by the product's design.33 The burden
of proof then shifts to the defendant34 to prove that the benefits
of the challenged design outweigh its inherent danger. Some of
the factors that the jury may consider are
the gravity of the danger posed by the challenged design,
the likelihood that such danger would occur, the mechani-
cal feasibility of a safer alternative design, the financial
cost of an improved design, the adverse consequences to
the product and to the consumer that would result from an
alternative design.3 1
In light of these factors, it will be difficult for the defendant to
sustain his burden of proof in any given case. In effect, once the
29. Id. at 435, 573 P.2d at 457-58, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40.
30. Id. at 418, 573 P.2d at 446, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
31. Id.
32. See text accompanying notes 37-39 infra.
33. 20 Cal. 3d at 432, 573 P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
34. [W]e conclude that once the plaintiff makes a prima facie
showing that the injury was proximately caused by the product's design,
the burden should appropriately shift to the defendant to prove, in light
of the relevant factors, that the product is not defective. Moreover, inas-
much as this conclusion flows from our determination that the fundamen-
tal public policies embraced in Greenman dictate that a manufacturer
who seeks to escape liability for an injury proximately caused by its
product's design on a risk-benefit theory should bear the burden of per-
suading the trier of fact that its product should not be judged defective,
the defendant's burden is one affecting the burden of proof, rather than
simply the burden of producing evidence.
Id. at 431-32, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
35. Id. at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
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plaintiff has shown the requisite causation, the defendant must
prove that the product could not reasonably have been de-
signed so as to prevent the plaintiff's injury in the particular
fact situation. 6
Once the plaintiff establishes that the product is defective,
he must further prove that the defect was the proximate cause
of his injuries. A defendant in a strict products liability action
"is entitled to expect a normal use of his product, and is not
liable when it is put to an abnormal one. ' 3 In Greenman, the
court held that it was "sufficient that the plaintiff proved that
he was injured while using the [product] in a way it was
intended to be used. ' 5 Subsequent cases have extended the
36. The defendant's difficulty in establishing that the benefits of his product's
design outweigh its inherent dangers are illustrated by the facts of Barker. The plaintiff
was injured at a construction site while operating a piece of heavy construction equip-
ment manufactured by the defendant. The defendant denied that the loader was
defective in any respect and claimed that the accident resulted either from plaintiffs
lack of skill or from his misuse of its product. The defendant contended that the
plaintiff had misused the loader by operating it on steep terrain for which the product
was unsuited. 20 Cal. 3d at 420, 573 P.2d at 447-48, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 229-30.
The jury returned a verdict for the defendant. On appeal, the decision was re-
versed on the basis that the trial judge gave an erroneous instruction to the jury to
the effect that "strict liability for a defect in design is based on a finding that the
product was unreasonably dangerous for its intended use." Id. at 417, 573 P.2d at 446,
143 Cal. Rptr. at 228. Such an instruction constituted reversible error, according to the
California Supreme Court, because the "unreasonably dangerous" element of the defi-
nition of defect had been rejected in Cronin. See text accompanying notes 19-21 supra.
The court then proceeded to enunciate its new two-prong test for defect. Barker,
though expressly rejecting the "unreasonably dangerous" concept as a part of the
plaintiff's burden, incorporated that concept into the defendant's burden of proof. By
requiring the defendant to establish that the benefits of the product's design outweigh
its inherent risks, the defendant must, in effect, prove a negative (that is, that the
design is not unreasonably dangerous).
Assuming that the plaintiff merely demonstrates that the design of the loader was
the proximate cause of his injuries at retrial, the defendant will have to establish that
the benefits of each alleged deficiency outweigh its risks of danger. According to the
court, "a product may be found defective in design, even if it satisfies ordinary con-
sumer expectations, if through hindsight the jury determines that the product's design
'embodies excessive preventable danger.' " 20 Cal. 3d at 430, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal.
Rptr. at 236.
After Barker, the plaintiff need only prove that the design of the product proxi-
mately cause his injury. The shifting of the burden of proof to the defendant to estab-
lish that his product was not defective eliminates the protection that was carefully
retained in Cronin.
Thus, California's new formulation of defect may prove to have rendered the
concept meaningless. Former Chief Justice Traynor's warning that the term "defect"
will become a fiction "if it means nothing more than a condition causing physical
injury" has gone unheeded. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products
and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363, 367 (1965).
37. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 102, at 667 (4th ed. 1971).
38. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64, 377 P.2d 897, 901,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
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concept of "use" to include the term reasonably foreseeable use
as well as normal or intended use.3 Obviously, the extension
of this element has greatly increased the scope of the manufac-
turer's liability. It is questionable, however, whether this ex-
tension of liability furthers the public policies underlying the
strict products liability cause of action.
THE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The major policies underlying the imposition of strict
products liability on manufacturers and sellers are safety in-
centive and risk distribution." Comment c of section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts indicates that the cause of
action is designed to implement a comprehensive marketing
policy4' of protecting unwary consumers from defective prod-
ucts. The incentive theory, according to one commentator,
imposes a highly stringent measure of strict tort liability
upon the manufacturer, who is in the best position to dis-
cover defects. It assumes that judgments paid to injured
plaintiffs will provide the incentive to manufacture safer
products. Left unarticulated is the implied premise that
all manufacturers can and should make safer products and
that their failure to do so is a social or moral failing-in
short, a return to a muted fault system of jurisprudence. 2
39. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 126, 501 P.2d 1153, 1157,
104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 437 (1972). In this case the court held that collisions, although not
intended uses of automobiles, are foreseeable and therefore strict liability is applicable.
40. See James, Products Liability, 34 Tax. L. Rzv. 192, 221-23 (1955). For a
general discussion of policies underlying strict liability, see W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
T E LAw OF ToRTS §§ 96-99 (4th ed. 1971).
41. On whatever theory, the justification for strict products liability
has been said to be that the seller, by marketing his product for use and
consumption, has undertaken and assumed a special responsibility to-
ward any member of the consuming public who may be injured by it; that
the public has the right to and does expect, in the case of products which
it needs and for which it is forced to rely upon the seller, that reputable
sellers will stand behind their goods; that public policy demands that the
burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended for consump-
tion be placed upon those who market them, and be treated as a cost of
production against which liability insurance can be obtained; and that
the consumer of such products is entitled to the maximum of protection
at the hands of someone, and the proper persons to afford it are those who
market the products.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A, Comment c (1965). See Green, Strict
Liability Under Sections 402A and 402B: A Decade of Litigation, 54 TEx. L. REv. 1185,
1189 (1976).
42. Polelle, The Foreseeability Concept and Strict Products Liability: The Odd
Couple of Tort Law, 8 RuT.-CmI. L.J. 101, 104-05 (1976).
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The risk allocation theory, however,
rests not on fault allocation but solely on the distribution
of economic risk; regardless of their volitional control,
manufacturers, distributors and retailers should, on policy
grounds, pay the inevitable and statistically predictable
costs of marketing products. This cost is socialized by
being passed on to consumers via the price mechanism.4'
Thus, whether strict liability is characterized as a fault" or no-
fault4" cause of action, the essence of the underlying policies is
consumer protection." The traditional defenses to strict prod-
ucts liability, however, constitute a recognition that in some
instances the underlying policy has been thwarted by the plain-
tiff's own action or inaction. Therefore, recovery is not war-
ranted.
THE TRADITIONAL DEFENSES BEFORE Daly
Although the term strict liability implies that a heavy bur-
den is imposed on the defendant manufacturer, this liability is
not absolute. Traditionally, courts have recognized two com-
43. Id. at 105. For a discussion of the effect of this policy in the field of explo-
sives manufacturing, see Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353
(E.D.N.Y. 1972).
44. See Horn v. General Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 372, 551 P.2d 398, 405,
131 Cal. Rptr. 78, 85 (1976) (Clark, J., dissenting); see generally Lasher, Strict Liabil-
ity in Tort for Defective Products: The Road To and Past Vandermark, 38 S. CAL. L.
REV. 30 (1965); Comment, Tort Defenses to Strict Products Liability, 20 SYRAcusE L.
REv. 924 (1969).
45. See Levine, Strict Products Liability and Comparative Negligence: The Col-
lision of Fault and No-Fault, 14 SAN DiExo L. REv. 337, 338 (1977); Polelle, The
Foreseeability Concept and Strict Products Liability: The Odd Couple of Tort Law, 8
RUT.-CAM. L.J. 101 (1976).
46. It is interesting to note, however, that in some situations the policy of con-
sumer protection precludes the imposition of strict liability. In McDonald v. Sacra-
mento Medical Foundation Blood Bank, 62 Cal. App. 3d 873, 133 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1976),
the court held that the vital need for the availability of blood to conduct modern
surgical practices and the relatively minor risk of consequent hepatitis infection justi-
fied a statutory exception to the application of strict products liability. See id. at 873,
133 Cal. Rptr. at 448; Shepard v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., 33 Cal. App. 3d 606, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 132 (1973). "[T]he imposition of strict liability for transfusion of contaminated
blood would not achieve the policy goal of added incentive to safety." 33 Cal. App. 3d
at 611-12, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 135 (emphasis in original). "The encouragement of an
adequate blood supply, therefore, appears to outweigh a plaintiff's right to be com-
pensated for damages incurred as a result of being administered contaminated blood."
Id.
See generally Franklin, Tort Liability for Hepatitis: An Analysis and a Proposal,
24 STAN. L. REV. 439 (1972); Van Wormer, Transfusion Associated Hepatitis, 12 CAL.
W. L. REv. 389 (1976); Comment, Blood Transfusions and the Transmission of Serum
Hepatitis: The Need for Statutory Reform, 24 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (1975).
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plete defenses to the strict products liability action: assump-
tion of the risk and misuse of the product.47
Assumption of the Risk
As defined by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, assump-
tion of the risk is the "form of contributory negligence which
consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encoun-
ter a known danger."'" Contributory negligence itself is not a
defense to strict products liability, but commentators have
noted that the two defenses have considerable overlap. 9 The
California courts have used the Restatement language in recent
cases to distinguish between assumption of the risk and contri-
butory negligence.
Ordinary contributory negligence does not bar recovery in
a strict liability action. "The only form of plaintiff's negli-
gence that is a defense to strict liability is that which con-
47. While the misuse concept is utilized as a defense and, in a practical sense,
is a defense to strict products liability, it is also used to negate the plaintiff's prima
facie case. The misuse concept has been used to show the lack of a defect in the product
and has also been used to show the lack of proximate cause. See General Motors Corp.
v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 349-50 (Tex. 1977). See generally Noel, Defective Prod-
ucts: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L.
REv. 93 (1972).
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n (1965):
Since the liability with which this Section deals is not based upon negli-
gence of the seller, but is strict liability, the rule applied to strict liability
cases . . . applies. Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a de-
fense when such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the
defect in the product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence.
On the other hand the form of contributory negligence which consists in
voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger,
and commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense
under this Section as in other cases of strict liability. If the user or con-
sumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless
proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured by it,
he is barred from recovery.
For a general discussion of the assumption of risk defense, see Twerski, Old Wine in a
New Flask-Restructuring Assumption of Risk in the Products Liability Era, 60 IOWA
L. REv. 1 (1974). See also Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 240 (1972).
49. "[Tlhe defense of assumption of risk and contributory negligence overlap,
and are as intersecting circles, with a considerable area in common, where neither
excludes the possibility of the other." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §
68, at 441 (4th ed. 1971).
Where they have been distinguished, the traditional basis has been that
assumption of risk is a matter of knowledge of the danger and intelligent
acquiescence in it, while contributory negligence is a matter of some fault
or departure from the standard of conduct of the reasonable man, how-
ever unaware, unwilling, or even protesting the plaintiff may be.
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sists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to en-
counter a known danger. For such a defense to arise, the
user or consumer must become aware of the defect and
danger and still proceed unreasonably to make use of the
product.""
There are two basic types of assumption of risk: express
and implied. Express assumption of risk is based on a prior
agreement between plaintiff and defendant whereby the defen-
dant is relieved from liability for harm resulting from defen-
dant's conduct or product."' The plaintiff expressly consents to
exculpate the defendant and assume responsibility for his own
safety.52
Implied assumption of risk is the form of the defense that
most often arises in products liability actions. This defense, as
explained by one commentator, is
based on a plaintiff's state of mind of uncoerced willing-
ness to encounter a fully appreciated risk-that is, a will-
ingness, with full understanding of the risk to himself or
his property, to remain or have his property remain within
the area of risk. This is consent to risk, not consent to
exculpation, and it is subjective in the sense that it is
based on a plaintiffs state of mind rather than his objecive
manifestations. 3
In contrast to this subjective implied assumption of the risk,
there is also an objective form. This form is based on the plain-
tiff's
objective manifestations of uncoerced willingness to en-
counter a fully appreciated risk, even though his uncom-
municated state of mind may be one of lack of full appre-
ciation of the risk or lack of willingness to encounter it.
50. Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 145, 501 P.2d 1163, 1169-70, 104 Cal. Rptr.
443. 449-50 (1972) (emphasis in original), citing Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265
Cal. App. 2d 228, 243, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306,-314 (1968) and Ruiz-v. Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co., 15 Cal. App. 3d 462, 470, 93 Cal. Rptr. 270, 275 (1971). See also Prosser,
Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 HASTINGs L.J. 9, 48-50 (1966).
51. Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA. L. Rv. 122,
124 (1961). For a discussion of express disclaimers, see Noel, Defective Products:
Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REv.
93, 120-21 (1972).
52. Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA. L. REv. 122,
124 (1961).
53. Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). Professor Keeton identifies
five variant forms of implied assumption of risk: (1) subjectively consensual assump-
tion of risk; (2) objectively consensual assumption of risk; (3) assumption of risk by
consent to conduct or condition; (4) associational assumption of risk; and (5) imposed
assumption of risk. Id. at 124-28.
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• . . The result of exculpation . . . is not an implication
in fact of plaintiff's manifestations; rather, it is a conclu-
sion imposed by law.54
Thus, one of these two forms of implied assumption or consent
to risk exists if the plaintiff has, in fact, the state of mind to
encounter willingly the risk or if his manifestations indicate
that the requisite state of mind exists.
The value of these distinctions appears to be purely aca-
demic. Few courts ever ponder such amorphous theoretical dis-
tinctions in considering a proffered assumption of the risk
defense.55 Plaintiff's subjective state of mind as to his knowl-
edge of the risk must, of necessity, be determined by his objec-
tive manifestations. In fact, the practical application of the
distinction takes its form in the degree of proof a court requires
to prove the plaintiff's state of mind. This, in turn, depends
upon the equities of the fact situation and the court's inclina-
tion as to which party should bear the cost of the plaintiff's
injuries. This application of differing standards is illustrated
by Brooks v. Dietz,5" a Kansas Supreme Court decision. The
majority opinion and the dissent expressed conflicting views
concerning the applicability of the assumption of risk de-
fense. It is apparent that the majority was applying a subjec-
tive standard while the dissent was applying an objective stan-
dard.
In Brooks, plaintiff, an experienced plumber and furnace
repairman, ordered a customer's family from their home when
he discovered a gas leak in their basement. Plaintiff then re-
turned to the basement without turning off the outside gas
valve. Plaintiff was injured in the subsequent explosion and
sued the manufacturer of the furnace in strict liability in tort."
The majority allowed plaintiff to recover, dismissing the as-
sumption of the risk defense by stating that
[mlere knowledge of the danger of doing a certain act
without a full appreciation of the risk involved is not suffi-
cient to preclude a plaintiff from recovery even though
there may be added to the knowledge of the danger a com-
prehension of some risk.58
54. Id. at 127 (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 138 n.42. See also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToaTs § 68,
at 448 (4th ed. 1971).
56. 218 Kan. 698, 545 P.2d 1104 (1976).
57. Id. at 699, 545 P.2d at 1106.
58. Id. at 708, 545 P.2d at 1112 (quoting Autry v. Walls I.G.A. Foodliner, Inc.,
209 Kan. 424, 497 P.2d 303 (1972)).
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Thus, the majority in Brooks applied the subjective form of the
defense by requiring the defendant to prove that the plaintiff
fully appreciated the danger that caused his injuries." This
requirement of actual subjective realization of the risk is the
view adopted by most courts.'"
The dissent in Brooks, however, proposed an objective
standard." The dissent's view would allow the defendant to
avoid liability under the assumption of risk defense if there
existed sufficient evidence from which it could be inferred that
the plaintiff knew of the risk. Crucial to the dissent's argument
was plaintiff's twenty-five years as a plumber and his twelve
years of experience with gas furnaces. This superior knowledge
and skill, it was argued, should raise the standard of care re-
quired of plaintiff and impute the knowledge of the risk of an
explosion to him.
The prevailing subjective view of the implied assump-
tion of the risk defense to strict liability requires the concur-
rence of two essential elements in any given fact situation.
The plaintiff must be aware of and understand the extent of
the risk he is assuming and must voluntarily choose to incur
that risk.2 Voluntary subjective assumption of the risk is a
"willingness or consent by the plaintiff to use a product he
actually knows is defective and dangerous." 3
The Policy Considerations
Although the subjective form of the assumption of the risk
defense to strict products liability is the majority view of the
courts, several commentators have noted dissatisfaction with
59. Comment, Torts: Strict Liability in Tort and Assumption of Risk, 15
WASHBuRN L.J. 503, 507 (1976).
60. Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and As-
sumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REV. 93, 125 (1972).
61. 218 Kan. at 710-12, 545 P.2d at 1114-15 (Miller, J., dissenting).
62. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF ToRTs § 68 (4th ed. 1971).
The role of assumption of risk in products liability cases is properly a
limited one. It applies only to actions of the consumer that shift the
blame from the manufacturer to him. Thus, courts require the plaintiff
to show he made "normal use" of the product. Moreover, if the plaintiff
understands the risk in a product .. .the harm thereafter incurred
would seem to be self-inflicted, and the plaintiff would then be barred
from recovery.
Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN.
L. REv. 363, 371 (1965).
63. Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and As-
sumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REv. 93, 106 (1972). "When the acceptance of the
possibility of danger is unreasonable, voluntary assumption of risk also constitutes one
kind of contributory negligence." Id.
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the consequences of this view. 4 The cause of action itself is
based not on the theory of fault, but on the public policies of
risk distribution and safety incentive."5 Thus, the subjective
knowledge element of the assumption of risk defense is imple-
mented to allow the plaintiff to recover in those cases in which
the courts are "primarily concerned with the need to protect
the plaintiff against his own choice."" The stringent require-
ments for the knowledge and voluntariness elements severely
limit the success of the defense in strict liability actions.
Since in the ordinary case there is no conclusive evidence
against the plaintiff on these issues, they normally go to
the jury; and since juries are notoriously unfavorable to the
defense, the percentage of cases in which the plaintiff has
actually been barred from recovery by his assumption of
the risk is quite small . . . .[lit is evident that a purely
subjective standard opens a very wide door for the plaintiff
who is willing to testify that he did not know or understand
the risk."7
Besides protecting plaintiffs from their unwise choices of
conduct, courts are also zealous to protect plaintiffs from de-
nial of recovery in cases where no reasonable alternative choice
of action was available." This element of the assumption of risk
defense, a voluntary encountering of the risk, is illustrated by
Buccery v. General Motors Corp." In Buccery, the plaintiff's
vehicle was found to be defective because it was not equipped
with head restraints.70 The assumption of the risk defense was
not established as a matter of law even though plaintiff was
subjectively aware that head restraints were absent, and he
understood the risk of injury in the event of a collision.7' The
64. See generally Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negli-
gence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REv. 93, 121-128 (1972); Twerki, Old Wine
in a New Flask-Restructuring Assumption of Risk in the Products Liability Era, 60
IOWA L. REv. 1, 39 (1974).
65. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63-64, 377 P.2d 897,
901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963). See also Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The
Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REv.
559, 560-61 (1969).
66. Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask-Restructuring Assumption of Risk in the
Products Liability Era, 60 IOWA L. REv. 1, 41 (1974).
67. W. PRossEa, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 68, at 447-48 (4th ed. 1971)
(footnotes omitted).
68. See generally Green, Strict Liability Under Sections 402A and 402B: A De-
cade of Litigation, 54 TEx. L. REv. 1185, 1215-16 (1976).
69. 60 Cal. App. 3d 533, 132 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1976).
70. Id. at 547, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
71. Id. at 550, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 616.
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court held that the defense did not apply as a matter of law
because a jury could reasonably have found that the plaintiff
did not fully understand the magnitude of the risk.72 The plain-
tiff was forced to choose between using the vehicle or finding
alternate transportation. His continued use of the vehicle was
not deemed an unreasonable choice and he was therefore al-
lowed to recover for his injuries.73
In Buccery, even though the plaintiff was subjectively
aware of the risk, the court allowed recovery because his choice
to encounter the risk was not voluntary. Thus, Buccery demon-
strates that the two elements of the assumption of risk defense,
knowledge and voluntariness, do not remain static in definition
or even distinct from each other. Rather, their individual
meaning and their relation to each other vary with the factsand the policies involved. To achieve the desired result the
court need only "describe the risk in a particularized form. It
could then be rationalized that plaintiff was encountering a
risk different from that which actually caused the harm."'74
Misuse of the Product
Misuse, the second pre-Daly defense to strict products lia-
bility, is based on the theory that a "seller is entitled to expect
a normal use of his product, and is not liable when it is put to
an abnormal one."75 Comment h of section 402A of the Re-
72. Id.
73. Id. at 550, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 616. "Plaintiff's testimony established beyond
question his awareness of the defect. Further, it showed his appreciation that there was
a risk or danger of injury from his head striking the rear window of the cab. Plaintiff
testified, however, that he did not fully understand the magnitude of this risk.
Id.
74. Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask-Restructuring Assumption of Risk in the
Products Liability Era, 60 IOWA L. REv. 1, 41 (1974) ("[A] court's choice of policy
factors as a basis for strict liability may affect considerably its final decision.") See
Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and Assumption
of Risk, 25 VAND. L. Rzv..93, 94 (1972).
75. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 102, at 668 (4th ed. 1971).
The seller is not liable when the product is materially altered before use, or is combined
with another product which makes it dangerous, or it is mishandled, or used in some
unusual and unforeseeable way. Id. Misuse of the product is sometimes labeled as a
defense and sometimes as a part of the plaintiff's prima facie case in strict liability.
Arguably, Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225 (1978), has abolished the misuse concept to some extent. Because the Barker
tests are stated in the alternative, it is arguable that even if the plaintiff misused the
product he may nevertheless recover under the second test by showing proximate
causation. This argument, however, is refuted by an examination of the misuse de-
fense. This defense has its origins from proximate cause and continues to use the
proximate cause analysis (that is, whether the intervening act (abnormal use) was
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statement (Second) of Torts states that
a product is not in a defective condition when it is safe for
normal handling and consumption. . . .Where, however,
he has reason to anticipate that danger may result from a
particular use ...he may be required to give adequate
warning."'
Underlying this defense is the realization that the risk dis-
tribution rationale of strict liability does not reach the
"adventurous consumer [who] has voluntarily placed himself
in a category distinct from the normal consumer who foregoes
the pleasure and convenience of using products in novel but
dangerous ways."" Thus, strict liability does not mean that the
defendant is to be a general insurer for the plaintiff regardless
of the manner in which he was injured. Although courts recog-
nize that the doctrine must have limits, "their efforts at an-
swering the questions posed in strict liability cases seem in
many cases to degenerate into either meaningless semantic dis-
putes or attempts at balancing the costs of the accident against
the costs of avoiding it."'7
s
Much of the confusion seems to stem from commentators'
and courts' use of the term misuse as synonymous with
abnormal use. For example, one author of an article on misuse
stated: "A manufacturer is generally not liable for an injury
caused by plaintiff's abnormal use of its product. A primary
point of inquiry concerns the elements of abnormal use that
will bar a misuser's recovery."" Courts commonly require the
plaintiffs use to be unforeseeable to the defendant in order to
relieve him of liability.80 This foreseeability element severely
restricts the availability of the defense. A California court, in
Self v. General Motors Corp.,' even required a manufacturer
reasonably foreseeable). Thus, the concept of misuse is inherent in proximate causa-
tion and is not abolished by the second test of Barker.
76. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OP TORTS § 402A, Comment h (1965). "If a consumer
employs a product in some extraordinary manner, and encounters a known danger in
the course of his conduct, the doctrine of product misuse will bar recovery from the
manufacturer." Holford, The Limits of Strict Liability for Product Design and
Manufacture, 52 TEx. L. Rav. 81, 89 (1973).
77. Holford, supra note 76, at 89.
78. Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE
L.J. 1055, 1056 (1972).
79. Comment, Misuse as a Bar to Bystander Recovery Under Strict Products
Liability, 10 Hous. L. REv. 1106, 1107 (1973).
80. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 126, 501 P.2d 1153, 1157, 104
Cal. Rptr. 433, 437 (1972).
81. 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1974).
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to "foresee some degree of misuse and abuse of his product,
either by the user or by third parties, and to take reasonable
precautions to minimize the harm that may result from misuse
and abuse."8
There are at least four ways in which a consumer can mis-
use a product: (1) use in a manner that disregards clear warn-
ings of danger; (2) use in contravention of a manufacturer's
written instruction; (3) use in a manner neither intended nor
actually foreseen; (4) use in a manner neither intended nor
reasonably foreseen.13 The first two types, uses that disregard
warnings and instructions, have considerable overlap with the
assumption of risk defense. In these situations the plaintiff
voluntarily and knowingly acts or omits to act contrary to the
manufacturer's instructions as to the proper use of the product.
The third formulation of the defense, a use neither in-
tended nor actually foreseen, does not represent the usual court
interpretation of the defense. This definition would apply a
subjective test to the defendant's foreseeability of such use. A
subjective test, that is, a defendant must actually foresee the
use to which the plaintiff put the product, would impose an
extremely onerous burden of proof on the plaintiff.84 How-
ever, it is interesting to note that utilization of this test would
place the same burden on the plaintiff as that imposed on the
defendant in proving the assumption of the risk defense. That
is, defendant must prove plaintiff's actual subjective knowl-
edge of the risk.
The fourth formulation of the misuse defense, a use neither
intended nor reasonably foreseen, is the type which courts gen-
erally recognize will bar plaintiff's recovery in a strict products
liability cause of action. The requirement that the defendant
not objectively foresee the improper use of his product is a
carry-over from the negligence theory of liability." A manufac-
82. Id. at 7, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
83. See Comment, Misuse as a Bar to Bystander Recovery Under Strict Products
Liability, 10 Hous. L. REv. 1106, 1108-10 (1973).
84. The subjective standard of actual foreseeability was formerly applied in
products liability cases predicated upon negligence. Under this test, a child who drank
poisonous shoe cleaner was denied recovery because shoe cleaner is for shoes and not
for internal consumption. Boyd v. Frenchee Chem. Corp., 37 F. Supp. 306, 311
(E.D.N.Y. 1941).
85. Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions or Warnings, 23
Sw. L.J. 256, 267 (1969). "[Wlhile foreseeability is a standard used to determine fault,
. .. it is also an important factor in determining the applicability of section
402A .. " Id., quoting LaGorga v. Kroger Co., 275 F. Supp. 373, 383 (W.D. Pa.
1967). See generally Dale & Hilton, Use of the Product-When is it Abnormal?, 4
WILLAmErr L.J. 350 (1967).
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turer will be held strictly liable for plaintiff's injuries if such
improper use of the product was reasonably foreseeable even if
he did not, in fact, actually foresee such use. 6
Daly v. General Motors Corporation-THE APPLICATION OF
COMPARATIVE FAULT TO STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
The limitations that the traditional defenses imposed
upon the courts in their examination of plaintiff's conduct in
strict products liability cases have been severely criticized. 7
Taking heed of this criticism, the California Supreme Court
reshaped this entire area of the law by incorporating compara-
tive fault concepts in strict products liability.8
The Effect of Daly on the Traditional Defenses
Writing for the majority in Daly, Justice Richardson
stated that by adopting comparative negligence principles "a
more just result [will] follow."89 The basis for the dissatisfac-
tion of the California Supreme Court with the traditional for-
mulation of the strict products liability cause of action is well
illustrated by the facts of Daly.
Plaintiffs, a widow and three minor children of the dece-
dent, brought an action in strict products liability against Gen-
eral Motors Corporation for damages caused by defendant's
allegedly defective product.9 0 The decedent, Kirk Daly, was
killed in a one-car accident on October 31, 1970. The decedent
was driving southbound on the Harbor Freeway in Los Angeles
at a speed of fifty to seventy miles per hour when his vehicle
collided with the metal divider fence.9 After the initial impact
86. Thomas v. General Motors Corp., 13 Cal. App. 3d 81, 89, 91 Cal. Rptr. 301,
306 (1970); Thompson v. Package Mach. Co., 22 Cal. App. 3d 188, 196, 99 Cal. Rptr.
281, 286 (1971).
87. See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 740-41, 575 P.2d 1162,
1171, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 389 (1978).
88. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
89. Id. at 737, 575 P.2d at 1169, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
90. Also sued in this action were Boulevard Buick, Underwriter's Auto Leasing,
and Alco Leasing Company, the successive links in the vehicle's manufacturing and
distribution chain.
91. It should be noted that, as in the Horn case, there was no allegation that the
defendants were responsible for the initial collision with the divider fence. These cases
involved only liability for the "so-called second collision in which the 'defect' did not
contribute to the original impact, but only to the enhancement of injury." Id. at 730-
31, 575 P.2d at 1164, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
An automobile collision is really two collisions. In the first phase of the
accident, the plaintiff's automobile collides with another automobile or
with a stationary object. Most of the property damage results from the
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the car spun counterclockwise, the door flew open, and the
decedent sustained fatal head injuries. The alleged defect was
an "improperly designed door latch claimed to have been acti-
vated by the impact." 2
It was undisputed that if the decedent had remained in the
vehicle he would not have been killed. 3 Plaintiffs' witness testi-
fied that the decedent's door opened when the "latch button
of the exterior handle of the driver's door was forcibly de-
pressed by some protruding portion of the divider fence." 94 It
was argued that the exposed push button constituted a defect
in design." Defendants' experts testified that the force of the
impact with the divider fence was sufficient to cause the door
to open even if it had been equipped with door latches of an
alternative design."
The trial court permitted the defendants to introduce evi-
dence demonstrating that the decedent did not have his door
locked at the time of the accident. The seatbelt-shoulder har-
ness system was also not in use. 7 Furthermore, evidence was
admitted which indicated that the decedent was intoxicated at
the time of the collision." The jury returned a verdict for the
defendants, and the plaintiffs appealed on the ground that the
"intoxication-nonuse" evidence was improperly admitted. The
California Supreme Court, applying traditional concepts, held
that the admission of that evidence in a strict products liability
action constituted reversible error because the conduct of the
decedent did not constitute either assumption of risk or misuse
of the product. 9
first collision, but the occupants of the vehicle usually sustain little or no
injury at this stage. Personal injuries occur most frequently in the second
collision, in which the occupants are thrown against or collide with some
part of their automobile.
Note, Apportionment of Damages in the "Second Collision" Case, 63 VA. L. REv. 475,
476 (1977).
92. 20 Cal. 3d at 730, 575 P.2d at 1164, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 731, 575 P.2d at 1165, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
95. Id.
96. The plaintiffs introduced evidence that "other vehicular door latch designs
used in production models of the same and prior years afforded substantially greater
protection." Id. at 731, 575 P.2d at 1165, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
97. The 1970 Opel owner's manual contained warnings that seat belts should be
worn and doors locked when the car was in motion for "accident security." Id.
98. The evidence of Daly's intoxication was admitted for the limited purpose of
determining whether decedent had used the vehicle's safety equipment. Id.
99. Id. at 744-46, 575 P.2d at 1173-74, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 391-92. The trial court
admitted the intoxication evidence because it related to decedent's failure to use the
safety devices. Such nonuse, the trial court reasoned, would bar recovery on the theory
of product misuse. Id. at 745, 575 P.2d at 1174, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
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The court in Daly, however, did not limit itself to the
specific question of whether evidence of the decedent's conduct
was admissible as being relevant to the defenses of assumption
of risk or misuse of the product. The court further examined
the entire area of decedent's conduct in relationship to tradi-
tional strict products liability and found the traditional con-
cepts to be inequitable."0The court's observation that traditional concepts of strict
products liability produce inequitable results is well-founded.
The cases that structured the evolution of the strict products
liability cause of action demonstrate that in shaping the di-
mensions of the doctrine the California courts lost sight of the
original purpose for its adoption. As enunciated in Greenman,
and cited with approval in Daly, that underlying purpose was
to "insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective
products are borne by the manufacturers that put such prod-
ucts on the market rather than by the injured persons who are
powerless to protect themselves."''
The California Supreme Court in Daly recognized that
injured persons who recover under strict products liability are
not always defenseless consumers. Accordingly, it enlarged the
area in which an examination of plaintiff's conduct is allowed
to include any negligence under the comparative negligence
principles'02 enunciated in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. 13 Plaintiff's
conduct may now be examined for the purpose of reducing the
amount recoverable as damages based upon the comparative
fault of the parties.' 0' Furthermore, the court in Daly reshaped
strict products liability by limiting the extent to which plain-
tiff's conduct will totally bar recovery. Assumption of risk,
to the extent that it is a form of contributory negligence, was
abolished by Daly. 105 Additionally, Daly contains an implica-
tion that the misuse defense is likewise abolished. 06
The practical effects of these abolitions, however, differ.
The vast majority of the strict products liability cases that
have barred plaintiff's recovery based on assumption of risk
100. Id. at 731-42, 575 P.2d at 1165-72, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 383-90.
101. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897,
901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963), cited with approval in Daly v. General Motors Corp.,
20 Cal. 3d 725, 736, 575 P.2d 1162, 1168, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 386 (1978).
102. 20 Cal. 3d at 742, 747, 575 P.2d at 1172, 1175, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 390, 393.
103. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
104. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr.
380 (1978).
105. See id. at 742, 575 P.2d at 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
106. Id. at 745, 575 P.2d at 1174, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
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have involved the type of assumption of risk that is merely
a form of contributory negligence. Therefore, assumption of
risk as a defense will be directly and significantly affected by
Daly. Other forms of assumption of risk rarely occur. Misuse
of the product, on the other hand, should not be as drastically
affected. While assumption of risk arises from, and directly
concerns, facts separate and apart from the plaintiff's prima
facie case and is, in this sense, a true affirmative defense, the
concept of misuse is interwoven into the very fabric of the
plaintiff's case. The misuse concept has been used to negate
the existence of a defect and causation."7 Because defect and
causation are still required to be proven by the plaintiff, mis-
use, to this extent, should remain a viable concept. 08 Analysis
would focus on causation and recovery would be reduced based
upon the parties' relative responsibility for the cause of the
injury. The application of comparative fault to misuse should
not go beyond these bounds.
Thus, Daly, in applying comparative fault to strict prod-
ucts liability, will drastically affect the defense of assumption
of risk but should less significantly affect the misuse con-
cept. Whether the court's solution-the application of compar-
ative fault-is the most appropriate means to remedy the prob-
lems perceived by the court remains to be seen.
Public Policy Considerations and Daly
The key elements of the strict products liability cause of
action are the existence of a defective product and an injured
consumer who is unable to protect himself from the defective
product.'" The problem sensed by the court in Daly is that the
concept of defect has evolved to mean almost anything that
causes a plaintiff's injury."' In addition, plaintiffs are permit-
107. General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 350 (Tex. 1977).
108. The Daly court cited General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344
(Tex. 1977), as extending comparative fault to the misuse concept. 20 Cal. 3d at 740,
575 P.2d at 1171, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 389. The court in Hopkins, however, did not broadly
apply comparative fault to misuse. Recognizing the origins and nature of the misuse
defense, the court in Hopkins limited the application of comparative fault to situations
in which the misuse of the product is a concurring cause of the injury and then only if
plaintiff personally misused the product. 548 S.W.2d at 351.
109. See discussion of the Greenman case in text accompanying notes 11-18
supra.
110. The court in Daly also held that in determining whether a product is defec-
tive, the jury can take into consideration provided safety features. The product thus
must be evaluated as a whole, not just the allegedly defective component. "The jury
could properly determine whether the [vehicle's] overall design, including safety
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ted to recover for their injuries regardless of their ability to
protect themselves.
The court, however, misconstrued the issue presented by
the facts of Daly when it stated:
Because plaintiffs' case rests upon strict products liability
based on improper design of the door latch and because
defendants assert a failure in decedent's conduct, namely,
his alleged intoxication and nonuse of safety equipment,
without which the accident and ensuing death would not
have occurred, there is thereby posed the overriding issue
in the case, should comparative principles apply in strict
products liability actions?"'
The question presented was not the expediency of the applica-
tion of comparative negligence principles. Rather, the issue was
whether strict products liability could be restructured so as to
protect consumers from defective products without subjecting
manufacturers to unwarranted liability. By injecting negli-
gence principles into a theory that was designed to disregard
negligence, the court unnecessarily eliminated essential protec-
tion for plaintiffs injured by defective products. The dissent
noted this result, commenting that
every defendant charged with marketing a defective prod-
uct will hereafter assert that the injured plaintiff did some-
thing, anything, that conceivably could be deemed contri-
butorily negligent . . . I need no crystal ball to foresee
that the pleading of affirmative defenses alleging contribu-
tory negligence . . . will now become boilerplate."2
The public policies of promoting safe product design and
equitably distributing risks will not be furthered by the appli-
cation of comparative negligence principles. Mere contributory
negligence on the part of the injured party should not defeat
or even diminish a plaintiff's recovery in an action brought in
strict products liability."' By the same token, conduct of the
plaintiff that causes the injury must not, in all instances, be
labeled mere contributory negligence. The interests of society
features provided on the vehicle, made it 'crashworthy,' thus rendering the vehicle
nondefective." 20 Cal. 3d at 746, 575 P.2d at 1175, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
111. 20 Cal. 3d at 731-32, 575 P.2d at 1165, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 383 (emphasis
added).
112. Id. at 759-60, 575 P.2d at 1183, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 401 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
113. According to the dissent, the result of applying comparative negligence
principles will be "to dilute the defect of the article by elevating the conduct of the
wounded consumer to an issue of equal significance." Id. at 759, 575 P.2d at 1183, 144
Cal. Rptr. at 401 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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and the public policies underlying the traditional strict prod-
ucts liability cause of action are not furthered by making man-
ufacturers absolute insurers of their products.
The California Supreme Court in Daly was grappling with
the unsatisfactory results obtained by the present formulation
of the strict products liability cause of action. The court recog-
nized that users of products must, consistent with the basic
public policy of equitably allocating loss, accept some responsi-
bility for their own actions which cause their injuries."4 That
recognition is evidenced by the court's adoption of comparative
negligence principles to limit the plaintiff's recovery. But the
attempt to homogenize strict products liability principles and
the principles of comparative negligence will necessarily result
in an unworkable system." 5 Justice Mosk's dissent described
the Daly decision as
the dark day when this court, which heroically took the
lead in originating the doctrine of products liability . . .
and steadfastly resisted efforts to inject concepts of negli-
gence into the newly designed tort, . . . inexplicably
turned 180 degrees and beat a hasty retreat almost back
to square one. The pure concept of products liability so
pridefully fashioned and nurtured by this court for the past
decade and a half is reduced to a shambles."'
The basis of Justice Mosk's strong criticism of the majority
decision is that strict products liability is based on the philoso-
phy that it is irrelevant if the manufacturer is at fault"' in
marketing a defective product. According to the traditional
theory, if the plaintiff's injury was caused by a defective prod-
uct the plaintiff may recover from the defendant manufacturer
even in the absence of negligence on the part of the defendant.
Under the court's holding in Daly, a jury must now apportion
plaintiff's recovery based on plaintiffs fault and defendant's
defective product."18 As Justice Mosk commented, "I know of
114. Id. at 737, 575 P.2d at 1169, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
115. See generally Levine, Strict Products Liability and Comparative Negli-
gence: The Collision of Fault and No-Fault, 14 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 337 (1977).
116. 20 Cal. 3d at 757, 575 P.2d at 1181, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 399 (Mosk, J., dissent-
ing).
117. "Products liability under § 402A does not rest upon negligence principles,
but rather is premised on the concept of enterprise liability for casting a defective
product into the stream of commerce." Id. at 762, 575 P.2d at 1184, 144 Cal. Rptr. at
402 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting from Kinard v. Coats Co., Inc., 553 P.2d 835, 837
(Colo. Ct. App. 1976)). See also Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113,
528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974).
118. See Levine, Strict Products Liability and Comparative Fault: The Collision
of Fault and No-Fault, 14 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 337, 356 (1977).
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no other instance in American jurisprudence in which the an-
tagonists are the conduct of a human being versus an inani-
mate object.""' It is difficult to conceive of how a jury, faced
with the task of comparing negligent conduct to conduct in
which negligence is irrelevant, will ever achieve equitable re-
sults.'20 Comparative negligence will not achieve the Daly
court's goal of more equitable results. Jury verdicts will be
haphazard, unpredictable, and will of necessity bear little rela-
tionship to an equitable apportionment of damages.
The court's goal is, nevertheless, a legitimate one. The
appropriate means to achieve that end, however, is to reform
the cause of action rather than to discard it in favor of an
unworkable hybrid of fault and no-fault theories. The court's
goal could be realized by redefining the traditional defenses to
strict products liability. Rather than adopting comparative
fault the court could have found that the decedent's conduct
in Daly constituted either assumption of risk or misuse of the
product.
It is recognized that courts decry the harshness of the total
bar to recovery occasioned by the application of the assump-
tion of risk and misuse defenses.21 A review of the development
119. 20 Cal. 3d at 762, 575 P.2d at 1185, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 403 (Mosk, J., dissent-
ing).
120. Levine, supra note 118, at 356.
In Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 334-35, 579 P.2d 441, 448,
146 Cal. Rptr. 550, 557 (1978), decided after Daly, Justice Clark in his concurring
opinion noted that
this case demonstrates the arbitrariness and wastefulness of the com-
parative fault system. . . . Plaintiff was injured when a shopping cart
broke and fell on her foot. Nest-Kart manufactured the defective cart,
Safeway maintained and inspected it. While the jury determined Safe-
way was 80 percent at fault, it could just as well have concluded the
manufacturer was 80 percent at fault. Such division is clearly arbitrary
because it is standardless. Blind inquiry into relative fault is no better
than the flip of a coin, and disputes over degree of fault must greatly
increase the time and cost of litigation. . . . It is now clear we have bred
a horse which can be neither saddled nor raced. Rather, he runs wild
awarding at whim.
121. The court in Daly expressed dissatisfaction with assumption of risk as a
complete defense to strict products liability. The court stated:
(W]e must observe that, under the present law, which recognizes as-
sumption of risk as a complete defense to products liability, the curious
and cynical message is that it profits the manufacturer to make his prod-
uct so defective that in the event of injury he can argue that the user had
to be aware of its patent defects. To that extent the incentives are in-
verted.
20 Cal. 3d at 738, 575 P.2d at 1169, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
This comment misstates the current state of the law. In the 1972 case of Luque v.
McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d. 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972), the California
Supreme Court expressly rejected the latent-patent distinction. In Luque, the plain-
tiff's hand was mangled in the unguarded hole of a power lawnmower. Even though
he was aware that the lawnmower blade did not have a guard, such knowledge did not
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of products liability demonstrates the increasing reluctance of
courts to deny recovery to injured plaintiffs on those bases.
Courts must be cognizant, however, that imposition of exces-
sive liability on manufacturers will not promote product safety
and may, in fact, conflict with the public interest.'22 As one
commentator notes:
Manufacturers will pass the costs of liability or of design-
ing safer [products] on to consumers in the form of higher
• . . prices. These higher prices are justified only to the
extent that they reflect design modifications reasonably
necessary to promote safety. . . . [Elxcessive manufac-
turer liability increases prices for consumers without im-
proving [product] design and substitutes an indirect in-
surance system of higher prices for improved liability in-
surance coverage.12
3
Thus, in some cases, imposing liability on the manufacturer is
not in the public interest. 21 Certain types of injuries are better
bar his recovery. The court noted that to require the "defect to be latent would severely
limit the cases in which the financial burden would be shifted to the manufacturer."
Id. at 145, 501 P.2d at 1169, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 449. The court in Luque voiced the same
concerns as the Daly court.
It would indeed be anomalous to allow a plaintiff to prove that a manu-
facturer was negligent in marketing an obviously defective product, but
to preclude him from establishing the manufacturer's strict liability for
doing the same thing. The result would be to immunize from strict liabil-
ity manufacturers who callously ignore patent dangers in their products
while subjecting to such liability those who innocently market products
with latent defects.
Id.
In a 1970 case, Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 629 (1970), the court stated that "even if the obviousness of the peril is conceded,
the modern approach does not preclude liability solely because the danger is obvious."
Id. at 473-74, 467 P.2d at 235, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
122. Although the Daly court was dissatisfied with the status of strict products
liability, it was reluctant to recognize that in some cases a plaintiff should not recover
merely because the design of a product contributed to his injury. Sometimes the denial
of recovery to a plaintiff will promote the underlying public policies of the cause of
action, while the granting of recovery to the plaintiff will denigrate them. As one
commentator has noted, "the development of the doctrine of strict products liability
demonstrates society's strong interest in rules of liability that increase protection of
human life, health and safety." Note, Apportionment of Damages in the "Second
Collision" Case, 63 VA. L. REv. 475, 489 (1977). The purpose of imposing liability on
manufacturers is to promote the design of safer products. As has been discussed,
however, the concept of defect has evolved to the point where what is defective depends
on the fact situation of each particular case.
123. Id. at 490.
124. "One who employs a power saw to trim his fingernails-and thereafter finds
the number of his fingers reduced-should not prevail to any extent whatever against
the manufacturer even if the saw had a defective blade." 20 Cal. 3d at 763-64, 575 P.2d
at 1185-86, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 403-04 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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prevented by modifying the behavior of the consumer.2 5 In
these instances, imposing liability on the manufacturer is un-
warranted because the public policies of strict products liabil-
ity are not furthered.
EXPANSION OF THE TRADITIONAL DEFENSES TO STRICT PRODUCTS
LIABILITY
Expansion of the traditional defenses to strict products
liability can better serve the public policies underlying the
cause of action. Limited expansion would allow the courts to
solve the specific deficiencies of strict products liability while
avoiding the repercussions of the broader, more general ap-
proach of comparative fault. The case of Horn v. General Mo-
tors Corp. " can be used to further illustrate the basis for, and
the scope of, the proposed expansion.
Horn v. General Motors Corp.
Lillian Horn swerved her 1965 Chevrolet station wagon to
avoid a head-on collision and struck a concrete-reinforced
abutment. As she steered to the right, her left hand displaced
the horn cap in the middle of the steering wheel. Upon impact,
her face struck three prongs that had held the horn cap in
place. As a result, Ms. Horn sustained a chin laceration, a
fracture of her jaw and left ear canal, and the loss of two
teeth.'27 Ms. Horn subsequently brought suit against General
Motors' 8 in strict liability in tort, claiming that her injuries
were aggravated because of the defective horn cap.'1 The evi-
dence demonstrated that the cap was insecurely fastened by
three sharp prongs. Consequently, the driver was exposed to
the possibility of contact with the prongs during a collision.
The jury found that this fastening mechanism constituted a
125. Note, Apportionment of Damages in the "Second Collision" Case, 63 VA.
L. REv. 475, 490 (1977).
126. 17 Cal. 3d 359, 551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1976).
127. The plaintiff was driving down Laurel Canyon Boulevard, a curving Los
Angeles street. A car swung into her lane, its headlights temporarily blinding her. She
swerved the vehicle to the right, bounced off the right curb across the street to the left,
and into a concrete reinforced abutment.
128. Fletcher Chevrolet, Inc., the dealer from whom the plaintiff had purchased
her automobile, was also named as a defendant. The jury in the trial court returned a
verdict against both defendants for damages in the amount of $45,000.
129. It was conceded by the plaintiff that neither defendant caused the accident
itself. 17 Cal. 3d at 365, 551 P.2d at 400, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 80 (1976).
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defect in design or manufacture.'30
As in Daly, the defendants in Horn urged that the plain-
tiffs failure to use the seat belts provided by the manufacturer
constituted assumption of the risk and, therefore, barred her
from recovery.'"' General Motors argued that "plaintiff con-
sciously chose not to use her seat belt with the knowledge that
such conduct would increase the risk of injury in the event of
a collision, since she would probably be thrown about the inte-
rior of the car."' 32 The California Supreme Court rejected this
contention on the ground that in order for plaintiff's negligence
to constitute assumption of risk and thereby a defense to
strict products liability, she must have voluntarily and unrea-
sonably proceeded to encounter a known danger.'3 Because
there was no evidence that plaintiff was aware of the specific
danger in question-that the horn cap was removable and
would expose sharp prongs-she did not assume the risk.' 3' Ms.
Horn's failure to use her seat belt, according to the court, "at
best indicated some negligence of a general nature. .... '"5
General Motors further argued that the nonuse of the seat
belts constituted misuse of the automobile.'36 Under the tradi-
tional formulation of the misuse defense, if a product is put to
a use that is not reasonably foreseeable, strict liability will not
be imposed.'37 The Supreme Court of California summarily dis-
missed this argument in Horn on the ground that the "driving
130. Defendants' expert admitted on cross-examination that the horn cap could
have been affixed by screws, thereby eliminating both the prongs and preventing the
displacement of the cap. Id. at 367, 551 P.2d at 401-02, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 81-82.
131. Id. at 369, 551 P.2d at 403, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
132. Id.
133. The defendants' argument was that the known danger was impact with the
interior of the car during a collision and that it is irrelevant that the plaintiff was not
aware of the exact point of impact. Id. at 369-70, 551 P.2d at 403, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
See also Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 243, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306,
314 (1968).
134. 17 Cal. 3d at 370, 551 P.2d at 403, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
135. Id. The court formulated the definition of "danger" very narrowly. In order
to prevail on the assumption of risk defense, the defendant had to prove that the
plaintiff was actually aware that the horn cap was easily removable, that three sharp
prongs would be exposed, and that failure to use seat belts would place her in danger
of impact on the prongs. Id.
136. Id.
137. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433 (1972). This case held that even though a collision is not the normal or intended
use of an automobile, manufacturers must take accidents into consideration as reason-
ably foreseeable occurrences. See also Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d
1270, 1276 (8th Cir. 1972); Johnson v. Standard Brands Paint Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d
331, 79 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1969).
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of an automobile without using a seat belt is an entirely fore-
seeable use of the vehicle."' 38
Assumption of Risk in Horn
Under the traditional formulation of the assumption of
risk defense, as evolved by the courts, the plaintiff must volun-
tarily encounter a specific known risk. The knowledge element
is met only by a showing that the plaintiff knew of the specific
danger, the degree of risk, and the manner in which the injury
would be caused. The traditional formula places a substantial
burden of proof on the defendant manufacturer, and the under-
lying public policies of strict products liability-safety incen-
tive and risk distribution-are not always promoted by such a
strict standard. This result is illustrated by the Horn case.
The plaintiff in Horn made no claim that General Motors
was responsible for the collision itself. In fact, the vehicle per-
formed properly in allowing the driver to swerve and success-
fully avoid a head-on collision with another automobile. The
causation of the injuries themselves merits comment. As the
plaintiff steered to the right to avoid the oncoming car, she
dislodged the horn cap with her left hand while she used her
right hand to hold her son on the front seat. Arguably, if the
seat belts had been in use they would not only have prevented
the plaintiff's face from hitting the horn cap, they would also
have prevented the collision with the concrete abutment, be-
cause both of her hands would have been free to control the
vehicle. Such nonuse of the safety devices was alleged by the
defendants to constitute assumption of risk.' 39
138. 17 Cal. 3d at 371, 551 P.2d at 404, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 84. The appellate court
had held that the trial court's ruling disallowing evidence of plaintiff's failure to use
seat belts to go to the jury was prejudicial error.
Conceding that the horn cap was defectively attached, as respondent
asserts, it appears to us that whether respondent's omission to use the
seat belt was the sole proximate cause of the injuries suffered in the
accident, or her failure to use a seat belt equated with an assumption of
risk . . . were questions of fact, either of which, if proved, would be a
complete defense against respondent's claim.
Horn v. General Motors Corp., 110 Cal. Rptr. 410, 415-16 (1973), rev'd, 17 Cal. 3d 359,
551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1976).
Defendants also urged that the seat belt evidence was admissible to demonstrate
that the failure of the plaintiff to use her seat belt was itself the proximate cause of
her injuries. This argument was also rejected by the court as another formulation of
the inadmissible defense of contributory ngeligence. 17 Cal. 3d at 370, 551 P.2d at 403,
131 Cal. Rptr. at 84.
139. Id. at 370, 551 P.2d at 403, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
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The voluntariness element of the assumption of risk
defense appears to have been satisfied in Horn. According to
one commentator, "plaintiff should not be absolved from his
choice unless the duress situation he faces is extreme.' 40 In
Horn, no duress existed. The plaintiff was not forced to relin-
quish use of her automobile in order to avoid the danger. Use
of the seatbelts would have been, at most, a slight inconve-
nience. The use of the seatbelts did not constitute an unreason-
able demand on the plaintiff to take responsibility for her own
safety.
Automobile manufacturers are required by law to install
seatbelts 4 because of their proven ability to reduce or elimi-
nate injury to occupants of vehicles involved in collisions.'
These safety devices restrain passengers from striking surfaces
on the vehicle's interior and from being ejected from the vehi-
cle. 4 1 It is clear that Ms. Horn was contributorily negligent in
failing to use her seatbelt.1" The court held that this contribu-
tory negligence, however, did not contain the knowledge ele-
ment necessary to constitute assumption of risk.' Even
though she was aware that the vehicle was equipped with seat-
belts and that such safety devices would restrain her and her
passengers from being thrown about the interior of the car in
the event of a collision, this knowledge was not deemed specific
enough.'4 Due to the fact that the plaintiff was unaware that
the horn cap was defectively designed, she was permitted to
recover for her injury.
The court in Horn, although willing to consider accidents
reasonably foreseeable for automobile manufacturers, was
unwilling to so hold for the plaintiff whose conduct may have
been the cause-in-fact of the accident. The court's reasoning
indicates that users of vehicles are being protected in a
"vacuum," and are not required to be cognizant of the
140. Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask-Restructuring Assumption of Risk in
the Products Liability Era, 60 IowA L. REv. 1, 40 (1974).
141. 15 U.S.C. § 1392 (1970); 49 C.F.R. § 571.209 (1977).
142. See 15 U.S.C. § 1381 (1970).
143. See id.; 49 C.F.R. § 571.209 (1977).
144. Horn v. General Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 369, 551 P.2d 398, 403, 131
Cal. Rptr. 78, 83 (1976). The trial court ruled such evidence inadmissible on the ground
that plaintiff's contributory negligence was not an issue because contributory negli-
gence is not a defense to strict liability. Id. See also Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136,
501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972).
145. 17 Cal. 3d at 370-71, 551 P.2d at 403, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
146. Id.
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"reality" of automobile collisions and preventive safety de-
vices.'
Revision of the Knowledge Element of the Assumption of Risk
Defense-A Limited Exception
The Horn and Daly cases illustrate a fundamental defi-
ciency in the knowledge element of the traditional assumption
of risk defense to strict products liability. The court's insis-
tence on subjective knowledge of a specific danger in the fact
of an objective awareness of the general danger encountered
by the plaintiffs resulted in an unjustified recovery. A limited
exception to this strict formulation of the knowledge element
in cases in which safety devices were not utilized by injured
plaintiffs would better promote public safety. When a plain-
tiff's injuries would have been prevented by use of available
safety devices, recovery should be denied on the basis of
assumption of risk. A vehicle user's general awareness that
such safety devices will prevent forcible ejectment or contact
with the interior should be held sufficient to satisfy the
knowledge element of the assumption of risk defense.
The proven ability of seatbelts to save the lives of thou-
sands of persons involved in collisions has resulted in the addi-
tional requirements of head restraints'" and shoulder har-
nesses.' This public policy of saving lives and reducing inju-
ries was directly involved in Horn. The plaintiff admitted that
her vehicle was equipped with seatbelts and that they were in
good working order at the time of the accident.150 The defect
147. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 126-27, 501 P.2d 1153,1157,
104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 437 (1972). The law does not require, however, that a product be
manufactured or sold free from all risk of harm. A product need not be found defective
simply because an accident has occurred. Henderson v. Harnischfeher Corp., 12 Cal.
3d 663, 527 P.2d 353, 117 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1974). For a general discussion of the crash-
worthiness concept, see Digges, The Impact of Liability for Enhanced Injury, 5 U.
BALT. L. REV. 1 (1976).
148. 49 CF.R. § 571.202 (1977).
149. Id. § 571.209S4.1(c).
150. Horn v. General Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 369, 551 P.2d 398, 402, 131
Cal. Rptr. 78, 83 (1976).
[A] seat belt is designed to protect against injury from the "second
collision" resulting when the body of the occupant, suddenly accelerated
or decelerated by the impact of the first collision, comes into contact with
the interior of the vehicle in which he is riding.
Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 1428, 1430-31 (1967). One recent commentator notes that it
"seem[s] illogical to cast liability upon an automobile manufacturer for an occupant's
collisions with its product's interior when an available safety device-for example, a
seat belt-could prevent or minimize the resulting injuries." Digges, The Impact of
Liability for Enhanced Injury, 5 U. BALT. L. Rav. 1, 19-20 (1975).
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involved, the horn cap fastening mechanism, was at most a
minor error in design. In contrast, the non-utilization of pro-
vided safety equipment by vehicle users represents a far more
serious denigration of the policy of public safety. By denying
defendants' assumption of risk defense on the basis that
plaintiff's knowledge of the risk was not specific, 5' the court in
effect placed total responsibility for safety on the manufac-
turer. In holding the defendant manufacturer responsible, the
court utilized the strict, subjective form of the knowledge ele-
ment of the assumption of risk defense. The court described
the risk in a particularized form;'52 that is, as a failure to realize
that there were sharp prongs under the horn cap. If, however,
the court had wanted to promote utilization of safety devices
by automobile users, it could have adopted the defendants'
characterization of the risk assumed by the plaintiff. Defen-
dants argued that
plaintiff consciously chose not to use her seat belt with the
knowledge that such conduct would increase the risk of
injury in the event of collision, since she would probably
be thrown about the interior of the car."153
This characterization of the risk involved would constitute
an objective, more realistic estimation of the plaintiff's knowl-
edge of the risk. It would impose upon the plaintiff the same
common sense requirements imposed upon automobile manu-
facturers in Cronin-that collisions are reasonably foreseea-
ble. 154 A judicial recognition that consumers take accidents into
consideration when using their vehicles would remove consum-
ers from their "vacuum" and attribute to them the knowledge
of the "realities of everyday use."' 55 Upon review of the compet-
ing policies in the Horn case, it is clear that public policy would
have been better served by denying recovery to the plaintiff.
This result could be attained in cases such as Horn by "a more
modest assessment of knowledge of the risk . . .. "I
If the court had analyzed the facts of Horn and Daly in
light of the policies of safety incentive and equitable risk distri-
bution, the plaintiffs would have been denied recovery. The
151. 17 Cal. 3d at 370, 551 P.2d at 403, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 369, 551 P.2d at 403, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
154. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 126-27, 501 P.2d 1153, 1157,
104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 437 (1972).
155. Id.
156. Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask-Restructuring Assumption of Risk in
the Products Liability Era, 60 IOWA L. REv. 1, 41 (1974).
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most productive method of promoting those policies would
have been to hold that the nonuse of vehicle safety equipment
constituted assumption of risk. This defense would bar
recovery in those instances where the injury, although nomi-
nally caused by a defect in the vehicle, could have been pre-
vented by the use of safety devices. Thus, a general awareness
that available safety devices will prevent ejectment or forcible
contact with interior surfaces should be deemed to satisfy the
knowledge element of the assumption of risk defense.
Nonuse of Safety Equipment-A Proposed Exception to the
Foreseeability Requirement of the Misuse Defense
Traditionally, the misuse defense has required that a
plaintiff's improper use of a product must not have been rea-
sonably foreseeable to the defendant. The Horn and Daly cases
illustrate that this foreseeability requirement does not always
further the underlying public policy. When courts require de-
fendants to foresee that consumers will not utilize provided
safety equipment, and thereby deny the availability of the mis-
use defense, plaintiffs are relieved of responsibility for their
own safety. The manufacturer, in effect, becomes a general
insurer of its product. Such an approach
convert[s] the tort system into something other than a
mechanism for determining the just distribution of acci-
dent losses. [It becomes] ...a mechanism for maximiz-
ing social utility by shifting the cost of accidents (or acci-
dent prevention) to the party to whom it represents the
least disutility. 157
In order to preserve strict products liability as a mecha-
nism for determining the just allocation of accident losses, a
limited exception to the foreseeability requirement of the mis-
use defense should be recognized. When a plaintiff's injury
would have been prevented by the use of provided safety equip-
ment, the failure to utilize such devices should be held to con-
stitute the defense of misuse and bar recovery. The foreseeabil-
ity of such nonuse should not be the controlling factor.
In analyzing Horn and Daly, it is important to recall the
underlying policies thought to be promoted by granting recov-
ery to a plaintiff in a strict products liability action. Those
policies should not be "ignored for the sake of inquiries about
insurance and the efficient allocation of resources."'' 8 Public
157. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HAsv. L. REv. 537 (1972).
158. Id. at 538.
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safety is not promoted by granting recovery to plaintiffs who
fail to utilize safety equipment. Risk distribution does not
imply that the party to be held liable should always be the one
who can best afford to pay for the injuries.'59 Injuries caused by
the failure to utilize safety equipment are more effectively pre-
vented by modifying the behavior of the users of the product
rather than by imposing excessive liability on the manufac-
turer.'60 A court should not concern itself with determining
which party could best afford to pay for the plaintiff's injury.
The court in Horn and Daly should have examined the merits
of the proffered misuse defense in light of the goal of furthering
the underlying policies of the strict products liability cause of
action.' 6'
Under the facts of the Horn and Daly cases, driving a car
without using seatbelts was objectively foreseeable to the man-
ufacturer. But the question of whether nonuse of safety equip-
ment constitutes misuse of the vehicle should also involve an
inquiry as to whether the plaintiffs failed to act responsibly for
their own safety. In order to promote the underlying policies of
strict products liability, the court should recognize that those
who fail to use automobile safety devices needlessly expose
themselves to the risk of serious injury. Courts can assume that
159. See Note, Apportionment of Damages in the "Second Collision" Case, 63
VA. L. REv. 475, 490 (1977).
160. Id.
161. This was the approach taken in a 1977 federal case applying California law,
Kay v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 548 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1977), which held that plaintiff's
misuse of the product negated the conclusion that a defect existed. In Kay, the pilot
of a Cessna Skymaster model 337 was killed when the aircraft crashed during takeoff
because of rear engine failure. The plaintiff urged that the plane was defective because
of the lack of a warning in the takeoff instructions. The trial court granted the defen-
dant manufacturer's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and held that
the pilot's failure to comply with the pre-takeoff instructions constituted misuse of the
product. Compliance with those procedures would have alerted the pilot to the rear
engine failure and the accompanying danger. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial judge's ruling on the motion. The court held that the pilot's failure
to follow safe operating procedures was not reasonably foreseeable to the manufacturer.
In denying recovery the court, in effect, recognized that the policy of promoting
safety would not be furthered by allowing recovery where the decedent had disregarded
the manufacturer's safety instructions. Although the court espoused the usual foresee-
ability test for the misuse defense, it appears that the court actually applied a different
standard. The failure to comply with the product's safety instructions is, after all, an
objectively foreseeable event. The court, however, recognized that the foreseeability
requirement should not bar the application of the misuse defense on those facts.
Because the pilot disregarded safetyinstructions, the plaintiff should not be allowed
to recover for the fatal injuries which would not have occurred but for the pilot's own
action. The policy of promoting public safety is furthered in such cases by denying
recovery to the plaintiff.
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automobile users are aware of the existence and purpose of
safety equipment.' 2
The court should recognize a limited exception to the fore-
seeability requirement of the misuse defense. Allowing plain-
tiffs who do not use safety equipment to recover for preventable
injuries detracts from the underlying public policies of the
strict products liability cause of action. Those policies are more
effectively promoted by deterring such conduct through the
denial of recovery. The application of the misuse defense in this
limited situation would accomplish that deterrence." 3
CONCLUSION
This article has traced the development of strict products
liability from its inception in Greenman to its apparent demise
in Daly. Special emphasis has been placed on the defect ele-
ment and the traditional defenses of assumption of risk and
product misuse. The Horn and Daly cases illustrate that the
goals of risk distribution and safety incentive are not always
furthered by granting recovery to the plaintiff. The analysis
demonstrates that the policies underlying the strict products
liability cause of action have been thwarted by the courts' nar-
row interpretation of the defenses. For the defendant to prevail
on the assumption of risk defense, the plaintiff must have
subjectively foreseen the particular risk which caused his in-
jury. By defining the risk very specifically with the benefit of
hindsight, the defendant is put to an insurmountable burden
of proof. By holding the defendant to an objective foreseeability
standard in the misuse defense, the plaintiff is relieved of re-
sponsibility to act reasonably for his own safety.
A simple revision of the traditional defenses to strict prod-
ucts liability readily achieves the goal left unfulfilled by the
imposition of comparative negligence principles. By reasonably
defining the risk of injury in the assumption of risk defense, the
court may hold cavalier plaintiffs responsible for disregarding
162. "It is now a matter of common knowledge that safety belts are effective in
reducing fatalities and minimizing injuries in motor vehicle collisions." Greyhound
Lines, Inc. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. App. 3d 356, 358, 83 Cal. Rptr. 343, 345 (1970).
See also Mortensen v. Southern Pacific Co., 245 Cal. App. 2d 241, 243, 53 Cal. Rptr.
851, 853 (1966); U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT ON THE ADMIN-
ISTRATION OF THE HIGHWAY SAFETY Acr OF 1966, PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION
202 OF THAT ACT, H.R. Doc. No. 91/109, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 16-18 (1969).
163. One recent federal case has allowed such a claim to go to the jury. The
claims of misuse of the automobile by the decedent in failing to use seat belts and in
driving while under the influence of intoxicants were presented to the jury. General
Motors Corp. v. Walden, 406 F.2d 606, 609 (10th Cir. 1969).
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their own safety. Persons who are, or should reasonably be,
aware that they are in a dangerous situation will thereby be
encouraged to assume some degree of responsibility for their
own safety. By enlarging the misuse concept to include nonuse
of provided safety equipment, plaintiffs will be encouraged to
refrain from using prodhcts in an unsafe manner.
The advent of comparative negligence in strict products
liability evidences a recognition that the underlying policies of
the cause of action are not being realized. The court, however,
chose an inappropriate remedy. The Daly decision will argua-
bly result in three undesirable results: (1) recoveries by plain-
tiffs injured by defective products will be reduced by any inci-
dental contributory negligence committed by the plaintiff; (2)
manufacturers will be liable to some extent for a plaintiff's
injuries regardless of whether plaintiff's actions constituted ei-
ther assumption of risk or product misuse; (3) the appor-
tionment of fault by the jury will be necessarily speculative and
will result in inconsistent and unjust results.
The Daly case demonstrates that courts, in their zeal to
achieve equitable results, sometimes lose sight of underlying
policies in fashioning an appropriate remedy. The responsibil-
ity for safety should not rest solely on the manufacturer. The
efficacy of safety devices is severely diminished if consumers
are not encouraged to utilize them. In 1944, Justice Traynor,
urging the California Supreme Court to adopt strict liability as
a basis for recovery in products liability actions, stated:
"[P]ublic policy demands that responsibility be fixed wher-
ever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and
health inherent in defective products that reach the market.' ' 4
This policy would be furthered by redefining the traditional
defenses to strict products liability so as to deny all recovery
to those injured parties who fail to use provided safety equip-
ment when such use would have prevented the injury.
164. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
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